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Abstract Many organizations offer their employees the
opportunity to voice their opinions about work-related
issues because of the positive consequences associated with
offering such an opportunity. However, little attention has
been given to the possibility that offering voice may have
negative effects as well. We propose that negative conse-
quences are particularly likely to occur when employees
perceive the opportunity to voice opinions to be ‘‘pseudo
voice’’—voice opportunity given by managers who do not
have the intention to actually consider employee input
(i.e., managerial disregard). The effects of this kind of
deception were examined by means of a survey among
employees (N = 137) and managers (N = 14) of a Dutch
healthcare organization. We hypothesized and found that
perceived pseudo voice led to reduced voice behavior and,
as a result, increased intragroup conflict. These results
imply that while offering voice opportunity is mostly seen
as an effective management strategy, negative effects are
likely to occur when a manager is perceived to try to
deceive employees by pretending to be interested in their
points of view.
Keywords Deceit  Intragroup conflict  Pseudo voice 
Voice behavior  Voice opportunity
Many organizations provide their employees with the
opportunity to present their views about work-related issues
(Markey et al. 2001). This is often referred to as offering
employees ‘‘voice opportunity’’ (Avery and Quinones
2002). The positive effects associated with offering voice
opportunity are well documented and include increased
feelings of fairness, trust, decision control, inclusion in the
group, and respect (for overviews, see Lind and Tyler 1988;
Miller and Monge 1986; Thibaut and Walker 1975). On the
other hand, little attention has been given to the possibility
that providing voice opportunity may also have negative
effects, which probably is because negative voice effects
are assumed to be quite rare (Lind and Tyler 1988).
Recently, however, scholars have suggested that negative
voice effects may not be as rare as previously thought
(Potter 2006b; Sagie and Aycan 2003), although empirical
evidence to back-up this claim is highly limited. Accord-
ingly, for both the scientific community and practitioners
(e.g., managers, decision makers) it is important to develop
a better understanding of the conditions under which pro-
viding voice opportunity to employees is likely to backfire.
The current research is a relevant first step in this regard.
In this paper, we argue that whether offering voice
opportunity to employees has positive or negative effects
depends on how employees perceive the motives of their
manager to provide them with such an opportunity. More
specifically, we propose that negative effects are likely to
occur when a manager is perceived to try to deceive
employees by pretending to be interested in their points of
view. That is, the manager encourages employees to share
their views about work-related issues without the intention
to really consider their input. We refer to this combination
of voice opportunity and managerial disregard as ‘‘pseudo
voice’’, implying autocracy covered with a mask of
democracy (Sagie and Aycan 2003). Torka et al. (2008)
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cite an operator from a textile printing factory who depicts
pseudo voice as follows: ‘‘It’s always been the same here
that it’s already been agreed upon before they even ask
your opinion. So, actually, it’s virtually all arranged and
then you can come along and say what you think.’’ (p. 151).
Lind and Tyler (1988) and Potter (2006b) have referred
to procedures that provide voice opportunity while the
input is never really considered as ‘‘sham’’.1 Our goal is
to demonstrate that perceived pseudo voice decreases
voice behavior and, eventually, increases conflict within
organizations, thereby demonstrating that providing voice
opportunity to employees can indeed have significant
negative effects.
The Ethics of Pseudo Voice
In organizational settings, pseudo voice is manifested in
distinct forms. For instance, when ideas posted in sugges-
tion boxes or the results of employee satisfaction surveys
are ignored. The suggestion box is a popular management
tool for offering voice opportunity but it could be quite
susceptible to perceptions of pseudo voice. There is a myth
that suggestion boxes are token gestures because organi-
zations all too often ignore the suggestions delivered in
these boxes (Opt 1998). Indeed, employees who suspect
that their suggestions are not used, or not even considered,
may easily start to believe that they are in fact offered
pseudo voice. In a similar vein, employee satisfaction
surveys may be seen as a form of pseudo voice when
employees suspect that management only uses those results
that suit them best.
Why would managers provide employees with an
opportunity to voice opinions if they do not intend to
actually regard their input? After all, offering voice
opportunity may be costly in terms of both time and money
(Milgrom and Roberts 1988). One reason why a manager
could decide to offer pseudo voice is when he or she
supports an autocratic leadership style whereas the orga-
nization requires a more democratic style. When offering
voice opportunity is part of an organization’s ideology and
requirements, managers simply have no choice but offering
such an opportunity. However, in this case autocratic
managers may be tempted to disregard the input of
employees all the same. In a way, this manifestation of
pseudo voice compares to what happened in communist
countries where socialist ideology and legal requirements
evoked voice opportunity but autocratic leaders disre-
garded it (e.g., Etzioni 1969; Heller 1971).
Although it seems that valuable time and money is
wasted if employees are encouraged to voice their opinion
while their input is actually not regarded, this is not nec-
essarily true. That is to say, offering voice opportunity has
proven to be an effective strategy to create feelings of
fairness, decision control, inclusion in the group, and
respect (Lind and Tyler 1988; Miller and Monge 1986;
Thibaut and Walker 1975), which in turn fosters employ-
ees’ work motivation, job performance, group morale,
trust, and policy acceptance (Chemers 2000; Lind and
Tyler 1988; Miller and Monge 1986; Terwel et al. 2010).
Indeed, this is why managers are often taught to consult
subordinates and solicit their suggestions before making a
decision. Important to note here is that managers may
establish such positive outcomes by offering voice oppor-
tunity even if they do not have the intention to really
consider the input, as long as employees do not perceive
managers to disregard their input. Thus, offering pseudo
voice is likely to positively affect the functioning of indi-
vidual employees and, as a consequence, the organization
as a whole when employees do not perceive that the voice
opportunity offered to them is, in fact, a hoax.
In the end, it all boils down to whether or not employees
perceive pseudo voice; they may perceive pseudo voice
when it is absent by objective criteria, and vice versa (see
Cohen 1989; Searle 1997). Although offering pseudo voice
may have positive effects if it is not perceived as such,
managers who engage in pseudo voice run the risk of being
perceived as intentionally deceitful, with all its conse-
quences. That is, they intentionally deceive employees by
giving the false impression that their employees’ views and
opinions matter and are seriously considered in an attempt
to create illusions of fair treatment (i.e., ‘‘fabrications of
justice’’, Cohen 1989). In their study on perceived deceit
during flights, Jehn and Scott (2008) proposed three forms
of deceit: deceit of intention, deceit of belief, and deceit of
emotions. One of the quotes reflecting perceived deceit of
intention strongly connects to the concept of pseudo voice:
‘‘They always say they’ll bring a pillow, and then never do.
In fact, I bet they never intend to!’’ (p. 334). In an orga-
nizational setting, this could be reframed as ‘‘My manager
often asks me what I think, but he never actually uses my
ideas. In fact, I bet he never intends to!’’. We propose that
it can be quite harmful when employees perceive that they
are being intentionally deceived.
Pseudo Voice and Voice Behavior
Employees who suspect that their manager does not intend
to regard their ideas, comments, and suggestions will not
be very motivated to engage in voice behavior (intention-
ally expressing work-related ideas, information, and opin-
ions; Van Dyne et al. 2003). If we return to the two
1 We prefer the term ‘‘pseudo voice’’ over ‘‘sham’’ because it refers
more specific to the voice situation. The word ‘‘sham’’ could refer to
more general situations.
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examples of pseudo voice that we gave earlier—the sug-
gestion box and the employee satisfaction survey—it is
reasonable to assume that employees who perceive pseudo
voice decide to leave the suggestion box empty and choose
not to complete the survey. Employees might experience
feelings of unfairness and outrage when they suspect that
the opportunity to voice opinion is a hoax (Cohen 1989).
Such feelings may cause them to display destructive, rather
than constructive, organizational citizenship behaviors
(OCB) such as intentionally withholding ideas, informa-
tion, and opinions. This phenomenon is also known as
‘‘employee silence’’ (see Morrison and Milliken 2000; Van
Dyne et al. 2003).
Employee silence is potentially an important negative
consequence of perceived pseudo voice. If employees
withhold expressing their views on work-related issues, the
organization does not benefit from their ideas and perhaps
useful suggestions which, if considered, could help
improve the organization’s performance. As research has
thus far been relatively silent on the possibility that voice
could also have negative effects (particularly likely in the
case that pseudo voice is perceived), this paper focuses on
perhaps the most basic yet important effect of pseudo
voice, namely the effect on voice behavior. Based on the
above reasoning, we hypothesize that more perceived
pseudo voice leads to less voice behavior (Hypothesis 1).
Voice Behavior and Intragroup Conflict
Reduced voice behavior may harm organizations in dif-
ferent ways. For one, if employees do not speak up any-
more, organizations cannot benefit from informational
diversity which is often present within organizations (e.g.,
Jehn et al. 1999; Stasser 1992). Informational diversity
refers to the presence of different perspectives and fields of
expertise due to, for example, different types of education
or work experience (e.g., Morrison and Milliken 2000).
Informational diversity has the potential to positively
influence group performance (Jehn et al. 1999) but ‘‘leav-
ing the suggestion box empty’’ is equal to leaving the
potential benefits of informational diversity untouched.
Perhaps, even more important than not taking advantage
of informational diversity is the possibility that reduced
voice behavior caused by perceived pseudo voice leads to
increased intragroup conflict, which can be defined as the
amount of tension and disagreements within a work group
(Jehn 1995). Intragroup conflict has been identified as one
of the main causes of organizational malfunctioning as it
may lead to decreased employee performance and satis-
faction (e.g., De Dreu and Weingart 2003; Jehn et al. 1999).
Therefore, it is important to know whether there is an effect
of reduced voice behavior (i.e., the proposed consequence
of perceived pseudo voice) on intragroup conflict.
There are different psychological processes that may
cause reduced voice behavior due to perceived pseudo
voice to increase intragroup conflict. First, the negative
feelings of deceit, unfairness, and outrage caused by
the perception of pseudo voice are likely to create a neg-
ative organizational atmosphere. A negative atmosphere,
which is characterized by negative attitudes (e.g., lowered
interpersonal trust and commitment to the organization;
Korsgaard et al. 1995) could cause counterproductive
behavior (see Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001). Recent
research shows that organizational illegitimacy (for
instance in the form of offering pseudo voice) can initiate
counterproductive work behavior. That is, in the mind of
employees, organizational authorities’ lack of legitimacy
deactivates the validity of formal organizational rules
(Zoghbi-Manrique-de-Lara 2010). In other words: ‘‘if the
boss does not stick to the rules, I don’t stick to the rules’’.
Counterproductive behaviors such as sabotage, organiza-
tional and interpersonal aggression, or other forms of
deviance (e.g., Spector 1978) could evoke conflict in the
workgroup that causes group members to act aggressively
toward each other.
Second, employees who perceive pseudo voice and
consequently withhold their point of view cannot exert
control over the decision-making outcomes. After all, they
do not share their opinion with the decision maker. If
employees feel that they cannot exert control through voice
or other constructive means, they may attempt to regain
control in ways that are destructive for the organization
(see Morrison and Milliken 2000). However, employees
might be reluctant to act out directly toward their manager
(or higher management) out of fear of retaliation or of
losing their jobs (e.g., Pelletier and Bligh 2008; Sims and
Brinkman 2002). Instead, we expect them to direct their
frustration at their coworkers rather than management and
to try to control their group members, for instance by
bossing them around, by showing nonco-operative behav-
ior, or by starting a fight. This behavior represents a form
of anger displacement—one of the defense mechanisms
coined by Freud—explaining the shift of aggressive
impulses to less threatening targets in order to avoid
dealing directly with what is threatening (e.g., Balkwell
1990). Based on the above, we hypothesize that reduced
voice behavior due to perceived pseudo voice increases
intragroup conflict (Hypothesis 2).
Hypotheses and Model
We propose that employees intentionally withhold their
opinions, ideas, or information when they perceive that
their manager encourages them to share their views about
work-related issues without his or hers intention to really
regard their input (pseudo voice). We further propose that
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intragroup conflict increases when employees withhold
their opinion as a result of perceived pseudo voice. In short,
we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 Perceived pseudo voice (the interaction of
voice opportunity and managerial disregard) leads to
reduced voice behavior.
Hypothesis 2 Reduced voice behavior due to perceived
pseudo voice leads to increased intragroup conflict.
Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of the pro-
posed relationships.
Method
Procedure and Sample Characteristics
We tested our hypotheses in an organizational field study
among employees from a Dutch multi-sited healthcare
institution (‘‘Company Care’’). Top management invited
325 employees to complete a survey under the condition
that responses were not retraceable to individual employ-
ees. The response rate was 42% (N = 137), which is
comparable to the average response rate for organizational
field studies (see Baruch and Holtom 2008; Cook et al.
2000). Employees with access to the internet completed a
web-based version of the survey (N = 76), others com-
pleted a paper and pencil version (N = 61). The sample
consisted of 121 females and 16 males between 16 and
60 years old (M = 41.10, SD = 11.02). On average, they
worked for 11.35 years (SD = 10.22) at Company Care.
Of the employees, 77% had completed vocational or higher
education. The survey asked employees to rate voice
opportunity, managerial disregard, voice behavior, and
intragroup conflict (see the ‘‘Measures’’ section below).
To avoid common-method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003),
we also invited 19 managers to complete a web-based
survey about voice opportunity, managerial disregard, and
intragroup conflict in the organization. The response rate of
the managers was 74% (N = 14). The sample of managers
consisted of six females and eight males between 37 and
60 years old (M = 46.93, SD = 6.47). On average, they
worked for 14.34 years (SD = 9.88) at Company Care and




Voice opportunity was assessed with three items based on
the scale developed by Lam et al. (2002), a = 0.87. An
example of an item was ‘‘I get the opportunity to influence
decisions affecting me’’ (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally
agree).
Managerial Disregard
Managerial disregard was assessed with five items (reverse
coded), a = 0.94. Examples of items were ‘‘My manager
regards our input for his/her decisions’’, and ‘‘My manager
uses the input for the benefit of the group’’ (1 = totally
disagree; 7 = totally agree). Because we constructed a
new scale to assess managerial disregard, we performed a
pilot test prior to the study with 37 employees of a con-
sultancy firm. The pilot test consisted of two extra items
derived from the ‘‘behavioral integrity’’ scale (Simons et al.
2007): ‘‘There is a match between my manager’s words
and actions’’ and ‘‘When my manager promises something,
I can be certain that it will happen’’. Factor analyses
revealed that these two items loaded on a separate
dimension and indeed measured behavioral integrity rather
than managerial disregard, which is why we did not include
them in the final assessment.
Voice Behavior
Voice behavior was assessed with seven items based on
Van Dyne and LePine (1998), a = 0.93. Examples of items
included ‘‘Do you speak up with ideas?’’ and ‘‘Do you
make recommendations concerning issues that affect your
team?’’ (1 = never; 7 = always).
Intragroup Conflict
Intragroup conflict was assessed with six items based on
work by Jehn (1995),2 a = 0.87. Examples of items
include ‘‘How many disagreements about work-related
issues are there in your work team?’’ and ‘‘How much
friction is there about personal, non work-related issues in











Fig. 1 Hypothesized model
2 Jehn (1995) distinguishes two types of conflict: task conflict and
relationship conflict. In our study, these two types of conflict were
strongly correlated (r = 0.66) and represented one factor in principal
component analysis, which is why we do not make this distinction
here.
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Manager Ratings
As Avery and Quinones (2002) noted, objective levels
of voice opportunity may differ from perceived voice
opportunity (and this holds true for managerial disregard
and intragroup conflict as well). Therefore, we asked
managers’ identical questions about voice opportunity,
managerial disregard, and intragroup conflict, and checked
whether their ratings were comparable to the employee
ratings.
Results
We compared employee and manager ratings of voice
opportunity, managerial disregard, and intragroup conflict
because similarity would increase our confidence about the
reliability of the employee ratings. Ratings of managers
and employees appeared quite consistent. First, manager
ratings of voice opportunity (M = 5.00, SD = 0.72) were
similar to the employee ratings (M = 5.10, SD = 1.01),
F(1, 149) = 0.15, P = 0.699. Second, results concerning
managerial disregard showed that managers rated mana-
gerial disregard a bit higher (M = 2.50, SD = 0.55)
than the employees did (M = 2.08, SD = 0.76), F(1,
148) = 4.15, P = 0.043. Apparently, employees did not
perceive as much pseudo voice as there was objectively.
Finally, managers (M = 2.43, SD = 0.71) and employees
(M = 2.48, SD = 0.89) reported equal levels of intragroup
conflict, F(1, 149) = 0.04, P = 0.848.
Our hypotheses and the resulting model (Fig. 1) imply a
conditional indirect effect, also known as moderated
mediation. We tested the proposed model by means of
hierarchical regression analysis (Muller et al. 2005; Aiken
and West 1991) and bootstrapping (Preacher et al. 2007).
All regressions controlled for the effects of education and
organizational tenure, since employees reported signifi-
cantly more voice behavior when they were better educated
(r = 0.26, P \ 0.01) and worked longer for Company Care
(r = 0.18, P \ 0.05), see Table 1.
First, we tested whether perceived pseudo voice led to
reduced voice behavior. We ran regression analysis with
pseudo voice (i.e. the interaction term between voice
opportunity and managerial disregard) as the independent
variable and voice behavior as the dependent variable,
controlling for the main effects of voice opportunity and
managerial disregard. As shown in Table 2, column 1, we
found a significant negative effect of perceived pseudo
voice on voice behavior (B = -0.21, P = 0.015), con-
firming Hypothesis 1.
Second, we tested whether less voice behavior led to
more intragroup conflict within the organization. We ran
regression analysis with voice behavior as the independent
variable and intragroup conflict as the dependent variable,
controlling for the effect of voice opportunity. As shown
in Table 2, column 2, we observed a significant effect
of voice behavior on intragroup conflict (B = -0.29,
P \ 0.001), confirming Hypothesis 2.
Mediation
As schematically represented in Fig. 1, we proposed that
voice behavior mediates the direct effect of voice oppor-
tunity on intragroup conflict. We performed hierarchical
regression analysis to test the relationship between voice
opportunity and intragroup conflict. The results showed a
significant negative effect of voice opportunity on intra-
group conflict (B = -0.27, P = 0.001), see Table 2, col-
umn 3. This negative effect implicates that reduced voice
opportunity leads to increased intragroup conflict. To
establish mediation, an effect of voice opportunity on voice
behavior (i.e., the proposed mediator) is required. This
effect appeared to be significant as well (B = 0.30,
P = 0.001), as shown in Table 2, column 1. Mediation also
requires an effect of voice behavior on intragroup conflict
(corrected for the effect of voice opportunity). As shown
previously, the second column in Table 2 shows a signifi-
cant negative effect (B = -0.29, P \ 0.001). The final
requirement for mediation is that the effect of independent
variable (i.e., voice opportunity) on the dependent variable
Table 1 Means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
Education level (1 = low/7 = high) 4.99 1.13
Organizational tenure (in years) 11.43 10.22 -0.144
Voice opportunity 5.10 1.01 0.253** 0.046 (0.87)
Managerial disregard 2.08 0.76 0.038 0.072 -0.423** (0.94)
Voice behavior 4.76 1.01 0.256** 0.176* 0.357** -0.187* (0.93)
Intragroup conflict 2.48 0.89 -0.063 0.075 -0.357** 0.272** -0.378** (0.89)
Note: The numbers in parentheses on the diagonal are a coefficients
N = 136, * P \ 0.05; ** P \ 0.01
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(i.e., intragroup conflict) disappears or is significantly
reduced when taking the effect of voice behavior into
account. As predicted, the effect of voice opportunity on
intragroup conflict was significantly reduced after con-
trolling for the effect of voice behavior (Sobel z = -2.76,
P = 0.014), although the direct effect remained statisti-
cally significant (B = -0.20, P = 0.014), see Table 2,
column 2. These results indicate partial mediation.
Moderated Mediation
Besides performing hierarchical regression analysis, we
performed bootstrapping using the method of Preacher
et al. (2007). Bootstrapping provides a method for probing
the significance of conditional indirect effects at different
values of the moderator variable. We examined the con-
ditional indirect effect of voice opportunity on intragroup
conflict (through voice behavior) at three values of mana-
gerial disregard: the mean (2.08), one standard deviation
above the mean (2.83), and one standard deviation below
the mean (1.32). Normal-theory tests indicated a significant
conditional indirect effect at the mean (P = 0.019) and at
one standard deviation below the mean (P = 0.013). We
also computed conditional indirect effects at various arbi-
trary values of managerial disregard to identify the regions
of significance; the values of managerial disregard for
which the conditional indirect effect is just statistically
significant at P = 0.05. Results demonstrated that the
conditional indirect effect was significant for any value of
managerial disregard smaller than or equal to 2.47. Thus,
consistent with our reasoning, the results obtained by
bootstrapping showed that the indirect effect of voice
opportunity on intragroup conflict through voice behavior
was conditional upon levels of managerial disregard.
In sum, our findings support the model proposed in
Fig. 1. Employees who received the opportunity to voice
their opinion and who perceived their manager to regard
their input showed more voice behavior and encountered
less intragroup conflict than employees who received the
opportunity to voice their opinion but perceived their
manager to disregard their input (the interaction we refer to
as pseudo voice).
Discussion
For managers, decision making about work-related issues
is an important and recurrent task. Managers are often
confronted with the choice to make a decision in an auto-
cratic way (i.e., unilateral decision making) or democratic
way (after consultation of their employees). They are often
taught to solicit their employees’ suggestions before mak-
ing decisions because democratic leadership is associated
with positive outcomes such as enhanced employee work
motivation, job performance, and group morale (e.g.,
Chemers 2000; Lind and Tyler 1988; Miller and Monge
1986). Although positive effects of voice opportunity are
quite robust and well documented, thus far little scientific
attention has been paid to the possibility that offering voice
opportunity to employees also can have negative effects.
The current research demonstrates that offering voice
opportunity has negative effects when employees perceive
to be offered pseudo voice—an illusion of influence that
occurs because the manager does not have the intention to
really regard the input. While scholars have theorized
about the concept of pseudo voice (Sagie and Aycan 2003;
Torka et al. 2008) and have illustrated its existence in an
organizational context by means of qualitative data (Potter
2006a), our study shows empirically that employees who
perceive pseudo voice are more likely to withdraw from
voicing their input and, as a result, encounter more intra-
group conflict. These insights are important to both theory
and practice.
Our work makes an important contribution to voice
literature by showing the relationship between perceived
pseudo voice and voice behavior (i.e., intentionally
expressing work-related ideas, information, and opinions;
Van Dyne et al. 2003). Several factors were already known
to influence voice behavior (e.g., Lam et al. 2002; LePine
and Van Dyne 1998) but it was not yet known that
perceived pseudo voice decreases voice behavior.
Table 2 Hierarchical regressions of voice opportunity, managerial
disregard, and pseudo voice on voice behavior and intragroup conflict





























R2 0.24 0.24 0.15
R2 change 0.04* 0.07** 0.14**
Unstandardized coefficients (B) are reported
N = 136, * P \ 0.05, ** P \ 0.01
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Furthermore, the current research contributes to conflict
literature by showing that voice behavior is a predictor of
intragroup conflict within organizations. Conflict research-
ers have proposed many predictors of conflict including
group value consensus, group atmosphere, and group
diversity (e.g. Jehn and Mannix 2001; Jehn et al. 1999);
however, to date, voice behavior has not been examined as a
possible determinant of intragroup conflict. We hypothe-
sized and found that employees who were given the
opportunity to voice their opinion and also perceived their
manager to regard their input tended to engage in more voice
behavior and to encounter less intragroup conflict than those
employees who received the opportunity to voice their
opinion but at the same time suspected their manager to
disregard their input (i.e., pseudo voice).
The current findings concerning managerial disregard
are in line with research by Bryson et al. (2006) on the
effects of managerial responsiveness. They observed a
relationship between employee perceptions of managerial
responsiveness and managerial perceptions of productivity,
implying that more responsive management improves
productivity. This reasoning connects to our finding that
responsive management (i.e., management that regards
employee input after soliciting for it) increases voice
behavior and reduces feelings of intragroup conflict, as
compared to managers who disregard employee input after
soliciting for it. Accordingly, we can only agree with
Bryson et al.’s advice that policy interventions should be
focused at how to motivate managers to become more
responsive to their employees.
Practitioners (e.g., managers, decision makers) could
benefit from the current research, as it provides a better
understanding of the conditions under which offering voice
opportunity to employees is likely to backfire. Allowing
employees the opportunity to voice their opinion is likely
to backfire when the decision maker is actually perceived
as trying to deceive employees by pretending to be inter-
ested in their points of view. Importantly, negative effects
of pseudo voice largely depend on perceptions of insin-
cerity, as it all boils down to whether or not employees
perceive pseudo voice. Employees may perceive pseudo
voice when it is absent and vice versa (see Cohen 1989;
Searle 1997). For this reason (and to be more confident
about the validity of the self-reported data), we also sur-
veyed the employees’ managers, which allowed us to
assess whether employees and managers perceived pseudo
voice differently. We found that managers reported to
disregard their employees’ input even a bit more often than
employees suspected. Apparently, employees did not per-
ceive as much pseudo voice as there was objectively. In
other words, employees were more frequently deceived
than they thought. This implies that this study had provided
a conservative estimate of the effects of pseudo voice.
From another perspective, this difference in perception
also indicates that there is at least some room for managers
to deceive their employees by unobtrusively using pseudo
voice. If a manager succeeds in offering employees an
illusion of influence without being noticed, the organiza-
tion benefits from the positive effects of voice opportunity,
and offering pseudo voice would be a successful strategy.
Recent literature provides examples of managers that might
deceive their employees by unobtrusively using pseudo
voice. These managers represent different dimensions of
the ‘‘dark triad’’ of personality: destructive narcissism,
corporate psychopathology, and Machiavellianism (see
Amernic and Craig 2010). We think that these managers
are all likely to pretend to be interested in their employees’
views on work-related issues without regarding the input
(e.g., Amernic and Craig 2010; Boddy et al. 2010; Nelson
and Gilbertson 1991).
Destructive narcissistic managers—in contrast to con-
structive narcissistic managers—can be described as
exhibitionistic managers with inflated self-views who are
fixated on power and prestige (see Amernic and Craig
2010). They may pretend to be interested in their
employees’ views because they have a strong need to be
surrounded by followers (Amernic and Craig 2010). At the
same time, destructive narcissists are likely to disregard
their employees’ views—especially when these views are
not in line with their own—because they think they know
best about what to do, are intolerant of criticism, and are
unwilling to compromise (e.g., Amernic and Craig 2010;
Duchon and Drake 2009). As such, destructive narcissistic
managers are likely to use pseudo voice.
Corporate psychopathic managers can be described as
managers who have no conscience and no ability to feel
any empathy or commitment for those who report on them
(e.g., Boddy et al. 2010). However, these managers are
often seen as successful (see Boddy et al. 2010). Corporate
psychopathic managers may create the illusion of democ-
racy because they want to keep up the appearance of the
successful, popular manager, and a democratic leadership
style fits that. However, for corporate psychopaths ‘‘there is
nothing they won’t do, and no one they won’t exploit, to
get what they want’’ (Morse 2004, p. 20), and they prob-
ably have no problems with deceiving their employees
because of their inability to feel any empathy or commit-
ment to them. Thus, corporate psychopaths may be able to
give their employees the opportunity to voice their opinion
but disregard their input at the same time.
Finally, Machiavellian managers can be described as
managers who are manipulative and who want to win at all
costs (e.g., Nelson and Gilbertson 1991; Tang and Chen
2008). Machiavellians may encourage employees to voice
their opinion as they tend to say things that others want to
hear and often use impression management tactics to create
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a favorable image (e.g., Nelson and Gilbertson 1991).
However, they are in fact mainly concerned with their
personal agendas rather than the common good (e.g.,
Cyriac and Dharmaraj 1994; Fraedrich et al. 1989; Nelson
and Gilbertson 1991; Rayburn and Rayburn 1996: Tang
and Chen 2008). Thus, Machiavellian managers are capa-
ble of offering voice opportunity without the intention to
regard their employees’ opinions. In sum, destructive nar-
cissists, corporate psychopaths, and Machiavellians may
typically be the type of managers to use pseudo voice as a
strategy to impose their own views while giving the
impression of providing voice opportunity. Future research
could aim to discover whether this is true or not.
However, even if managers are willing to engage in such
unethical behavior—use pseudo voice as a strategy to
impose their own views—and succeed in eliciting the
positive effects of voice opportunity, this success will
probably be only short lived. That is, if managers keep on
offering pseudo voice, it is likely that their employees will
soon notice that their input is not regarded, and the
accompanying negative feelings will undo the positive
effects of voice opportunity. As a result, employees are
more likely to suspect pseudo voice in future situations;
they recall that their input was disregarded in the past and
will expect this to happen each time they are offered voice.
Thus, offering pseudo voice may be an effective manage-
ment strategy in once-only decision making but is unlikely
to remain effective in recurrent decision making. Worse
still, it could easily backfire and have negative conse-
quences such as reduced voice behavior and increased
conflict.
Employees may also suspect pseudo voice when there is
none—people perceive lies when none have actually
occurred (Elaad 2003). Indeed, in their study on perceived
deceit during flights Jehn and Scott (2008) found that even
though the aircrew was telling the truth, many passengers
suspected to be lied to. Employees may perceive pseudo
voice particularly when managers do not provide proper
feedback how employee input has been used. Without such
feedback, employees do not learn that their input was used.
Therefore, managers should only give voice opportunity
when they are able to convince their employees that they
have the intention to regard their input and are also able to
show how they used this input. In other words: do not
install a suggestion box if you have no intention to regard
the suggestions.
However, we like to stress the fact that providing voice
opportunity has positive effects when the input is regarded
(and this is perceived as such). Providing voice opportunity
creates positive feelings among employees and is likely to
positively affect the functioning of individual employees
and thus the organization as a whole (e.g., Lind and Tyler
1988; Miller and Monge 1986; Thibaut and Walker 1975).
Therefore, we do not want to advise against democracy, we
only advise against autocracy covered with a mask of
democracy.
Our research is among the first empirical studies to
examine the possibility that there may be negative effects
associated with offering voice opportunity, which is why we
have chosen to focus on perhaps the most basic effect of
perceived pseudo voice, namely its effect on voice behav-
ior. We made some assumptions about the psychological
processes underlying the effects observed with regard to
voice behavior and intragroup conflict. For instance, we
suggested that feelings of deceit, unfairness, and outrage
cause employees who perceive pseudo voice to show less
voice behavior. Furthermore, we reasoned that the accom-
panying negative organizational atmosphere and felt lack of
control would instigate intragroup conflict. Further research
is needed to examine whether these psychological processes
indeed account for the effects observed.
Although we surveyed employees with different tasks
and from different backgrounds, our sample was limited to
one organization: a health care organization in a demo-
cratic country. We do not expect that the current findings
only apply to this specific organization or that pseudo voice
is an issue that is only relevant to the healthcare branch.
However, it would be interesting to see how people in
countries with communist and/or dictatorial regimes react
to pseudo voice. As stated earlier, communist countries
differ from democratic countries in that their socialist
ideology and legal requirements could evoke voice
opportunity, but autocratic leaders may disregard it (e.g.,
Etzioni 1969; Heller 1971). Democratic countries like the
Netherlands, where the current research was conducted, are
well-known for their voice culture. The Netherlands even
have a name for it, the ‘‘poldermodel’’.3 Since voice is such
an important part of daily organizational practice in dem-
ocratic countries, it could be that people in democratic
countries are more susceptible to pseudo voice, or perceive
pseudo voice more easily than in communist countries.
Future research could be aimed at researching the influence
of political culture on perceptions of pseudo voice.
Conclusion
The positive effects associated with giving employees the
opportunity to express their views and voice their opinions
to management are well documented, but little attention
3 A popular explanation of the ‘‘poldermodel’’ is based on the
situation that a large part of the Netherlands consists of ‘‘polders’’;
low-lying land that has been reclaimed from a body of water. Ever
since the Middle Ages, leaders from competing cities in the same
polder were forced to share their ideas to maintain the land, and avoid
being flooded.
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has been given to the potential negative effects of offering
voice opportunity. The current research shows that offering
voice opportunity to employees may indeed have negative
effects, in particular in the case that employees suspect
their manager to pretend to be interested in their input
without the intention to actually regard it. This type of
managerial insincerity is a form of deceit which we refer to
as offering ‘‘pseudo voice’’. Perceived pseudo voice leads
to reduced voice behavior and increased intragroup con-
flict, as compared to the situation in which managers ask
people to voice their opinions and do consider what people
have to say. In other words, when employees perceive
pseudo voice, they stop talking and start fighting.
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